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of work within the broad scope permissible in wartime under the 1940 Selective
Service Act. If it would in no way contribute to the successful prosecution of a
war, a fortiorari it is without the scope permissible in peacetime.
Granting, however, that Niles' contention in the recent case'3 is correct, that
the work offered him is not related to natinal defense and therefore the Statute
which authorized such assignment is in violation of the 13th Amendment, it leads
to the following anomalous situation. Congress, in endeavoring to respect the con-
victions of the conscientious objector regarding service in the military per se, offers
him work in a charitable institution which would seem to have a great deal of
appeal to him. But this enables him to take the position that Congress must con-
fine such offer to work that supports the military or contributes to the national
defense, which in principle should be just as repugnant to his convictions as actual
military service would be. However sound his argument of unconstitutionality may




Hoffman v. Perrucc%,' decided in October of 1953, was one of several cases which
have considered the question of whether out-of-court publications by insurance
companies of advertisements, and the distribution of pamphlets directed against
high jury awards, is punishable as indirect or constructive contempt of court. In
the principle case the printed matter stated that excessive awards in personal injury
suits by juries was the cause of insurance rates increasing. The specific issue was
whether these publications by the insurance companies, not parties to the personal
injury proceedings, caused such an improper influence on prospective jurors as to
obstruct the proper administration of justice in the court.
The plaintiffs maintained that the conduct in this respect of the insurance com-
panies denied them a fair trial by jury, and therefore, that the insurance companies
were guilty of indirect criminal contempt of court. This has been defined as con-
duct directed against the dignity and authority of the court.
These advertisements were distributed in nationally circulated magazines. The
pamphlets were distributed independently of the magazine advertisements. Some
portrayed a jury room together with a message to the effect that more accidents
and excessive jury awards, rendered by jurors who feel they can afford to be gen-
erous with the "rich" insurance company's money, are the cause of increased
insurance rates. Another advertisement stated that juries were not deciding the
case upon the evidence, but were controlled by their emotions in sympathy to the
injured party All the advertisements concluded with the statement that the ex-
cessive awards given by jurors are tending to establish the "going" rate for day
to day out of court claims, resulting in increased rates to the public. The court in
the principle case, without discussing the validity of the conclusions drawn in the
publications, held that these publications did not interfere with the ordinary ad-
ministration of justice in the action pending before it. Using the test announced in
Bridges v. Californza,2 the court held that: "There is not present that extremely
33 See note 3 supra.
1117 F.Supp. 38 (E.D.Pa. 1953).
2 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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high degree of imminence of the substantive evil which would justify punishment
of the publications. ' The court also noted that the intent of the publication was
not to influence the particular jurors of the pending action before it, but to influence
the public mind generally.4 The court felt that the plaintiffs had a safeguard in
their right to a fair trial by being able to challenge jurors before the jury was
empaneled. This challenge could inquire into the effect these publications had upon
the convictions of the jurors relating to high or excessive awards.
Publications of this order were also under consideration in a case before a
United States District Court in the State of Washington. 5 There, the plaintiffs
complained that the insurance companies had conspired to interfere with the
administration of justice in the plaintiff's personal injury suit. They maintained
that the companies were instructing the jurors in the manner and method of ad-
judicating facts and evidence and assessing damages in the action. This proceeding
was one for summary contempt. The power of a federal court to punish for con-
tempt is provided for by statute.6 The applicable section and subsection provide:
"A court of the United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none others as (1) Misbehavior
of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the adminstration of
justice."
In granting the motion to dismiss, the court applied the interpretation placed on a
comparable former statute, enacted in 1831, by the United States Supreme Court.
7
The Supreme Court there held that the phrase "so near thereto" meant actual
geographical, physical nearness to the court and not relevancy Therefore, acts
which reasonably tend to obstruct the administration of justice, if committed at a
substantial distance from the court, do not come within the scope of the statute.
This construction overruled a former interpretation by the Supreme Court,8 which
had held that the phrase "so near thereto" meant "reasonable tendency "This new
construction, the court felt, conformed more to the intent of Congress. That intent,
the court felt, was to limit the power of the federal courts to punish for contempt
more strictly than like powers given by the states to state courts. The Washington
District Court, after adopting the construction of the statute, placed an additional
limitation upon the interpretation of the statute:
"Prospective jurors who have not as yet been summoned to appear for service at the
place where the court is held are not component parts of the court; and distribution
to them of the magazine article, described m the relator's petition, could not be re-
garded as misbehavior in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to interfere,
in a physical sense, with the court's functions."9
The court did not make a direct finding as to the effect of the articles on the after-
empaneled jurors, but the court, referring to Hoffman v. Perruccz,10 found that in
these advertisements there was not present that extremely high degree of immi-
3 Hoffman v. Perrucd, 117 F.Supp. 38, 40 (ED. Pa. 1953).
4 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
5 United States ex rel. May v. American Machnery Co., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.
Wash. 1953).
6 63 STAT. 90, 28 U.S.C. 385 (1940) as amended, 18 U.S.C. 401 (1949).
7 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
8 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
9 United States ex rel. May v. American Machinery Co., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 160, 163
(E.D. Wash. 1953).
10 See note I supra.
NOTES
nence of the substantive evil which would justify punishment of those responsible
for them.
Underlying and supporting the two district court decisions relating to such
publications by insurance companies is the broad, national, constitutional policy
developed by the United States Supreme Court. The policy safeguarding freedom
of speech and press was thoroughly reviewed in Bridges v. California." The court
in that case adopted as a practical guide and controlling principle, the "clear and
present danger" test formulated in Schenk v. United States.'2 Certain editorials by
Los Angeles newspapers were highly critical of a possible adverse decision, from
the viewpoint of the editor by a California court in a labor case. Also published in
a newspaper was a telegram sent by Harry Bridges to the Secretary of Labor
intimating that a strike might be called tying up the-Los Angeles port if the de-
cision was enforced. These outbursts of free expression were held not to be so in-
timidating as to threaten a mind of reasonable fortitude, such as a judge's mind
should be. The court, after reviewing the Common Law on free speech and press,
concluded that it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution to secure to the
people of the United States a greater freedom of expression than that enjoyed by
the people of Great Britain. Reaffirming the "clear and preesnt danger" test, the
court adapted it to the pending cpntroversy" "What finally emerges from the clear
and present danger cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished."'13 And again, the court stated:
"The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from
published criticisms wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For
it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind although not always in perfect
good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely
n the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resent-
ment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect."' 14
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion condemned the conduct of the newspapers
as a trial by newspaper and maintained that this question should be approached
with the view that these liberties of free expression themselves depend upon an
untrammelled judiciary to whom is given the power to preserve those liberties.
The position of the majority was reiterated in Pennekamp v. Florida.'5 The
court there emphasized that the "clear and present danger" test should be applied
by the state courts by their own law and standards, and these decisions would
only be disturbed if the application of these standards was shown to be arbitrary
and unreasonable. The authority of the Supreme Court to determine the meaning
and the application of the provisions of the First Amendment to the states as
adopted by the Due Process clause is well established.'6
The insurance cases discussed above arose in a state court and a federal court,
respectively The federal court, by applying the new construction placed upon the
federal statute, has replaced the "reasonable tendency" rule with the physical
proximity test. Therefore, these advertisements of the insurance companies in
11 See note 2 supra.
12 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
13 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
141d. at pp. 270-271.
15 See note 4 supra.
10 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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